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The Economics Behind Law in a
Market Economy: Alternatives to
the Neoliberal Orthodoxy1
Joseph E. Stiglitz
We noted in the introduction that China, like developing countries all over the
world, has been urged to adopt a set of institutions, typically described as “best
practices” and thought to characterize the Anglo-American model of market
economy. Underlying a successful market economy, it is argued, there exists a
rule of law—and by rule of law what is meant is not just any legal framework, but a
particular one, what we referred to in the introductory chapter as the “neoliberal
orthodoxy,” based on “Chicago School” economics.2 It is important to place this
approach, which focuses on notions such as “secure property rights,” in perspec-
tive. It has long been the subject of intense debate among both economists and
legal scholars. Although the Chicago School has had enormous influence in
thinking about legal and other institutions, it no longer represents the best
thinking about the relationship between law and economic policy—far from it.
As we explained in the Introduction, as a matter of economics, many of the
foundational premises of the Chicago School have been challenged. As a matter of
law, the institutions thought necessary for market efficiency have been shown to
be far more variable and contingent. And there is more to a successful economy
than just efficiency. There is not a single best set of institutional arrangements that
work for countries in different circumstances with different objectives. Countries
face choices about their institutional arrangements, and the choices about strategy
and institutional form are critical, particularly as China puts in place institutional
arrangements that will have a long-term dynamic effect on the structure of the
Chinese market economy. As China sets out to create a market economy with
Chinese characteristics, as it sets out to advance its objectives of creating a
harmonious society, as it thinks about institutional designs that provide the
flexibility for changing course as it advances in its development (in accord with
the principle of “crossing the river by feeling the stones”), it needs to think
carefully about the full range of consequences of each of the alternatives—not
only for efficiency and equity today, but for how current choices are likely to
impact its future evolution.
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This chapter explains the limitations both of the underlying economics upon
which the neoliberal orthodoxy is based and of some of the associated legal
principles.
UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS AND ANALYSES
AND THE CRITIQUES
Underlying the policy stances of the neoliberal law and economics tradition are
certain analytics; and underlying those analytics are certain assumptions. In the
past three decades, research has called into question the assumptions, showing
that the results are not robust—even small changes in assumptions lead to major
changes in conclusions, e.g., concerning the efficiency of markets. And events
have called into question both the relevance of its underlying assumptions and the
conclusions that follow from them.
Neoliberal analysis is predicated on assumptions of rational and well-informed
consumers interacting with profit-maximizing firms in competitive markets in a
world with perfect risk and capital markets. Under these assumptions (with a few
additional ones—the absence of externalities, such as those associated with the
environment, and the absence of public goods), markets are (Pareto)-efficient.3
Subsequently, it was shown that whenever information is imperfect or risk
markets incomplete—that is always—markets are not (constrained Pareto)-effi-
cient (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986).
The Chicago School responded with a variety of opposing arguments. In the
case of externalities, it was argued that markets could and would efficiently
“internalize” the externalities. Most influential was the work of Coase (1960),
which suggested that in the absence of transaction costs, clear and unambiguous
assignments of property rights lead to efficiency (the Coase Conjecture), even with
externalities. If nonsmokers are given the rights to the air, then smokers will pay
them to be allowed to smoke if and only if the value of what they gain from
smoking exceeds the value of what the nonsmokers lose. If smokers are given the
rights to the air, then nonsmokers will pay the smokers not to smoke, so long as
the value of what they gain from having a smoke-free room exceeds the loss that
smokers incur in not being able to smoke. Either system of assigning property
rights could lead to economic efficiency in the absence of transaction costs. Where
there are transaction costs, the efficiency gains from lowering these costs are often
given primacy in determining desirable legal rules. There are, of course, distribu-
tional consequences to these alternative assignments of property rights, but these
are typically not the focus of the analysis.4,5
In response to the critique that markets are often not competitive, Chicago
School economists argued that the scope for anticompetitive behavior is limited.
Even if there was only one firm, as is the case with a natural monopoly, potential
competition was all that was needed to ensure that firms do not exploit their
market power. Competition for the market replaced competition in the market.
The implication was that there was little need for antitrust action (indeed, the risk
is that government intervention would impede real competition in the market
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place).6 This was called the contestability doctrine (Panzar and Willig 1977;
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982). But then, like the other attempts to defend
doctrines of market efficiency, this view too was debunked, as it was shown that
markets would not be contestable so long as there were any sunk costs, no matter
how small (Stiglitz 1988). The example highlighted by advocates of contestability—
the airline industry—had outcomes that were highly noncompetitive.
The Chicago School never came up with responses to other critiques: the failure
of markets to be efficient, for instance, when information is imperfect and asym-
metric, or that markets are often imperfectly competitive, or that transactions
costs are significant, in which case the assignment of property rights did make a
difference.7
Chicago School economic analytics had some derivative implications, such as:
individuals should be allowed to freely contract with each other; the government’s
only role is to enforce the contracts that have been made;8 the stronger the
intellectual property rights, the better. In this view, the role of government is
limited to ensuring property rights and enforcing contracts that are “market-
supporting” while avoiding regulation that seems to “distort” market prices.
Individuals and firms will have an incentive to make use of assets efficiently and
to make the set of contracts that works best for them; and in pursuing their private
interests, they ensure the efficiency of the economy as a whole.
As we have noted, modern economic theory has questioned both the under-
lying assumptions and the derived economic propositions. Information is often
imperfect and markets (including futures and risk markets) are never complete.
Individuals and firms have been shown to be not fully rational. This was evident in
the run up to the 2008 financial crisis—as it has been evident in the periodic
bubbles and panics that have characterized market capitalism’s history. The
consequences of irrationalities and other market failures can be devastating.
When profit-maximizing firms exploit these irrationalities, the outcomes are
often especially unpleasant—again seen dramatically in the crisis, as banks ex-
ploited poor and less-educated borrowers through predatory lending practices.
Other market failures are also hard to ignore: many of the major markets (finance,
media, computer operating systems, applications, airlines, microprocessor manu-
facturing) are far from perfectly competitive.
Free contracting does not generally result in economic efficiency; in particular,
problems arise when contracts between two parties affect third parties (e.g., a loan
between parties A and B affects the likelihood of default with Party C). Competi-
tive contracting equilibriums are also not efficient whenever there are signaling
problems (e.g., bankruptcy provisions may be used as a costly and inefficient
signal).
Strong property rights can even impede economic efficiency. Consider, in
particular, intellectual property rights. Knowledge is a public good, and intellec-
tual property rights (giving the knowledge producer exclusive rights over the use
of the knowledge that he has produced) can introduce a static inefficiency in the
economy.9 Whether intellectual property rights is in general the best way of
ensuring the efficient production of knowledge is a moot question; but poorly
designed property rights, giving temporary monopoly power to a particular
corporation or individual, can actually impede innovation and distort the short-
run allocation of resources.
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Since issues of efficiency and distribution cannot be separated (e.g., in the
presence of agency costs),10 then how property rights are assigned can affect the
efficiency of the economic system.
Finally, societal well-being may be affected by distributional considerations—
which may not be simply and easily altered by political processes. This has been a
key point of legal critiques—the background rules will set the market running
toward alternative equilibria.
BEYOND THE CHICAGO SCHOOL LAW
AND ECONOMICS TRADITION
This chapter explores the consequences of these realities for the key hypothesis of
the Chicago law and economics tradition—that the role of government is simply
to ensure clear property rights and that property rights and contracts are rigor-
ously enforced. So far, we have argued that this underlying economic presumption
is false, that if the government does this, market outcomes will not be efficient.
Moreover, we have argued that even if the outcomes were efficient,11 society cares
about the distribution of income and redistributions are not costless.12
The purpose of the law is not just to ensure efficiency, but also to enable socially
desirable outcomes (in China’s parlance, for instance, there is a concern about
achieving a harmonious society). Indeed, society may be concerned not just with
outcomes, but with the processes by which they are achieved.
The Chicago perspective failed not only in its view about the underlying
economy, but also about the objectives of law. The two failures get intertwined
in the Chicago School’s overly simplistic views of property and property rights, of
what “security of property rights”might mean, and of what a good property rights
system might look like.
Rights and obligations in an interdependent world
As we have noted, the assertion that all the government should do is simply make
sure that property rights are clearly assigned and enforced is wrong. Such an
approach would unbalance the economic system, deferring equity issues while
consolidating the authority of some over society’s resources. More importantly,
however, this approach to property is simply incoherent. Property is not just about
“rights.” Every right is matched by an enforceable duty upon other actors to respect
that right—rights impose costs, and must be understood in relational terms.
A fundamental problem for policy arises from the fact that what each individual
does affects others. If an individual smokes, it affects nonsmokers. A building next
door may block my sunlight. A car driving down the road forces me to be more
careful as I cross the street. A factory’s smoke makes life unpleasant for those
living next door.
It is simply impossible to say, other than as a matter of political choice, who
“caused” the “harm”—the factory that smokes up the house or the household that
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wants to live smoke-free next door. There would be no “externality” if there were
no house next door. Economists argue that individuals should pay the full costs of
their actions. This is sometimes put in a temporal context. Assume a house has
been constructed, a family has already taken up residence, and a firm is consider-
ing constructing a factory. Then the factory presumably should take into account
the costs imposed on the adjacent family before it makes a decision to build. But
this seems to assign property rights on a first-come-first-serve basis—and if sunk
costs are low, there is no reason to believe that this will result in an efficient
outcome. Moreover, it could induce an inefficient “race.” Consider two adjacent
plots of land. If the homeowner builds first, he will receive compensation for the
pollution, but not otherwise.
As a legal matter, one must “assign” responsibility somewhere and there ought
to be a political or economic or ethical basis for doing so. What makes such an
assignment so difficult is that, as Coase points out, there are often joint costs of a
set of adjacent economic activities, and we need a larger perspective to assess the
impact of various arrangements on the total value of production.13 Western
governments have settled on a set of principles that guide actions, but leave
many questions unanswered. In the context of environmental externalities, there
is widespread acceptance of the polluter-pays principle. A regulation restricting
pollution is simply a more efficient way of inducing good behavior than forcing
those engaging in pollution to compensate those who have been damaged. As a
society, we have decided that individuals and firms should not have the right to
emit air and water pollution. (Part of the reason may be that it would be hard to
run a system in which individuals were paid not to pollute. Everyone who does not
pollute might claim that he could and would pollute were he not to receive
compensation.)
Most governments have decided that society as a whole should not pay com-
pensation for the loss in market value as a result of the passage of a regulation (a
so-called regulatory taking). In a sense, government has certain “residual rights”
of control—one cannot restrict the ability of government to pursue the public
interest.
Particularly problematic are definitions of rights, obligations, and constraints
associated with social constructions, such as corporations and intellectual
property.14
The legal framework affects the consequences of different actions and therefore
frames the actions that will be taken.15 It may do this in dozens of different ways:
by criminal law, tax law, direct or indirect regulation, tort law, or by specifications
of the rights, privileges, and duties comprising property law. Provisions may be
mandatory, discretionary (with discretion given to the prosecutor or adminis-
trative authority), or may require action by the affected parties themselves.
Penalties may be mandatory, discretionary (with the judge or other official),
may be predetermined and fixed, or may vary with the impact of the injurious
activity, or may be subject to bargaining by the affected parties. The law could
prohibit a factory from polluting—sending the factory owner to jail if, say, his
factory’s pollution exceeds a critical level. It can impose criminal penalties, as a
strong inducement for the factory owner not to engage in activities that inflict
harm on others. It may use zoning, not allowing houses to be built in the vicinity
of the factory, so that no one will suffer the impacts of the factory’s pollution. It
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might allow houses to be built, specifying that anyone moving in cannot sue the
factory owner. Or it can allow the homeowner to sue for compensation for
undoing the damage of the pollution. It can require the factory to pay a price
for its pollution—and it can take some of the money received to compensate those
who might be adversely affected.
Note that the bundle of entitlementswe call “property” famously includes the legal
privilege to injure (in certain particular ways) other economic actors without paying
compensation. For example, I can set up a competing business on my property
adjacent to yours even if it puts you out of business and forces you to sell your land.
There is no avoiding making regulatory choices in the design of a property
rights regime which determines just how strict or lenient the duties on others will
be—have they a duty to never trespass or only to avoid trespass absent an
emergency? Must they respect your intellectual property no matter what, or
might they make “fair use” of it? When, moreover, will the privilege to injure be
limited—can I set up a noxious factory adjacent to your home or only a compet-
ing business? Though intellectual property rights give one a temporary monopoly
power in the use of that knowledge, it does not give one the right to abuse that
monopoly power by engaging in anticompetitive practices.
Accompanying “rights” are obligations. An owner of land may have the right to
use his land, but he may also have the responsibility to make sure that no one uses
his land to dump toxic waste that spoils the underlying ground water. Accom-
panying intellectual property rights is an obligation to disclose information so that
others can build on the knowledge. The owner of a telephone company may have
an obligation to provide interconnectivity.
Not only can these questions of policy not be avoided; there is, in general, no
one best way to resolve them. There are, of course, efficiency arguments for the
assignment of responsibilities (as well as rights): the landowner may be in the best
position to monitor its usage; it is a natural by-product of other economic
activities, including those associated with ensuring the value of the asset. In this
view, it is “efficient” to assign to the owner the responsibility to ensure that his
property does not become a toxic dumping site.
Under certain idealized circumstances (e.g., the absence of transactions costs),
economic efficiency could be achieved under a variety of rules for assigning
property rights, and there has developed a tradition that argues that property
rights should be assigned in ways that minimize transactions costs. It would be
very expensive for each individual to ascertain who might harm him or her by
driving recklessly, seek the potential “harmers” out, and compensate them for not
harming. It is accordingly more efficient to give individuals the right not to be
harmed, imposing the responsibility of not having an accident on the driver. But
such assignments have distributional consequences, and there are costs associated
with undoing those distributional costs—which also need to be viewed as part of
the “transaction costs” of the system. Thus, there is no way of simply focusing on
efficiency, in a narrowly defined way.
In the end, how property rights are assigned does affect the nature of the
equilibrium that emerges. There are (in the language of economists) wealth
effects. The nature of the equilibrium that emerges today affects the equilibria
that emerge in the future, which society may care about. These are societal choices,
made through political processes.
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In short, there are choices. One cannot simple devolve responsibility for these
choices to economists, viewing them as “societal engineers,” looking for the “best
design” (least cost) system.
THE COMPLEX NATURE OF PROPERTY
We have argued that property rights and obligations are a social construction, and
the task facing any society is how to construct the legal system (here we focus on
property rights) in a way that advances societal objectives. The task of the social
scientist is to help clarify the set of feasible choices and their consequences. One of
the objections to the Chicago School’s approach is that it slid over the wide range
of choices facing every society, pretending that there was only one “choice,” which
effectively Pareto-dominated all others (i.e. makes all individuals as well or better
off than any of the alternatives). We will look at several examples of these
choices—in particular, how they are bundled and how rights can be changed.
Alternative mechanisms for “regulating” behavior
The choices individuals make are affected, as we have noted, not just by property
rights but also by regulations (which can in fact be viewed simply as restrictions
on the use of property and thus as a part of the property rights system) and taxes.
All of these change the opportunity set facing firms and individuals in ways that
alter their behavior in order to induce behavior that is more congruent with
social objectives. A fundamental result of modern economics is that tax policy
can accomplish much of what regulatory policy can, i.e., by shaping the returns
that individuals reap from various actions, tax policies shape the actions that
individuals take. Thus, we see more holistically property rights, regulatory
policies, and taxes as alternative instruments for structuring the behavior of
individuals, households, firms, NGOs, etc., including their relationships with
each other.
To take one example: one can induce individuals not to pollute either by
imposing formal regulations, by taxing pollution, or by making individuals pay
for the damage done by the pollution, through a liability system.
Once we recognize that what matters are the consequences, it becomes appar-
ent that, indeed, there may be many functionally equivalent ways of achieving the
same outcomes. One can have a mandate, say, that all individuals have health
insurance. A mandate is a requirement, enforceable either by a large monetary or
civil penalty. Assume there were a $500 fine for not having health insurance, and
assume health insurance costs $2000. One could get the equivalent result by
imposing a $500 tax on everyone, but simultaneously, providing a tax credit of
up to $500 for anyone who purchased (qualified) health insurance.
Government can try to shape the behavior of individuals and firms, not only
through ex ante interventions (affecting prices or imposing constraints before
actions are undertaken) but also through ex post actions (imposing penalties after
certain adverse consequences arise).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 25/10/2012, SPi
Economics Behind Law in a Market Economy 159
Comp. by: PG2846 Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0001744174 Date:25/10/12 Time:17:16:32
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001744174.3D160
One can go even further: one can allow punitive damages, i.e., the wronged
party collects more (sometimes much more) than the losses incurred. He is, in
effect, rewarded for acting as a “private attorney general.” This provides strong
incentives to private citizens to enforce the law and strong deterrence to potential
offenders.16
Indeed, there is an even broader range of social decisions. One can have a
system of taxes to induce “good” behavior or a system of regulations to require it;
but society can choose to supplement such a system with a liability system.
Individuals suffering injury may, under certain circumstances, be allowed to sue
even though there is a regulatory or tax system in place; or they may not.
Regulating the use of tobacco (a poisonous substance) may relieve tobacco
companies of the liability for the harm done by their product and their failure
to adequately represent those risks, or it may not.
Each of these regimes has distributional and efficiency costs (broadly defined, to
include transaction costs).
One of the problems with many liability systems is that they intertwine the design
of incentive systems with compensation systems. The liability penalties that are
imposed on individuals when they have an accident to compensate those who have
been injured generally do not equal the penalties that we might impose if our
objective was to induce individuals to take the appropriate amount of care while
driving. An argument can be made for the separation of these two functions. Some
countries have adopted a no-fault approach to accidents: individuals are compen-
sated for injury, and individuals who drive recklessly are punished. But there is no
necessary link between the amount paid by one party and that received by the other.
Liability systems are thus part of a property rights system: The individual has a
right not to be injured, and those who injure him in a particular way are required to
pay compensation. As we noted in the previous section, which “wrongs” are subject
to compensation is a matter of policy. Of course, the choice of property rights
regimes affects the “value” of different assets, both by restricting what can be done
by the owners of those assets, changing the consequences of their actions, and by
restricting what others can do that might affect the value of the asset (or changing
their incentives in ways that alter actions that might affect the value of the asset).17
In general, the neoliberal orthodoxy has a strong preference for ex ante price
interventions. This is based on the belief that markets, in general, work well, and
one of the reasons that they work well is the price system, which effectively
communicates information in a decentralized economy. Accordingly, if the gov-
ernment is to interfere with the market, it should do so in the most limited way. If
prices don’t fully reflect social costs, then the best thing to do is to correct prices.18
There is, in this view, a presumption against broader regulatory interventions.
Modern economic theory has shown that these presumptions are not, in fact
valid, e.g., when information is imperfect and markets are incomplete, as they
always are. Weitzman (1974) long ago showed that in the presence of uncertainty,
quantity regulations may be superior to price interventions. Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) showed that nonlinear taxation was superior to linear taxation when
the government faced information constraints and distributive objectives. (For a
textbook exposition of these ideas, see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980.)
Similarly, consider the presumption discussed earlier against ex ante regulation.
Liability systems attempt to alter behavior by inducing individuals to take into
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account more fully the costs of their actions. With a fully articulated set of liability
laws, regulations directed at least at negative externalities would be unnecessary.
There would be no negative externalities; they would all be internalized. But such a
system is likely to entail high administrative costs. Perhaps the worst example is
provided by the US law concerning toxic wastes, where litigation costs represent
more than a quarter of the amount spent on clean-up. It is often difficult to
ascertain who is to blame for a particular problem (even with a well demarcated
and well designed system of “rights”). And sometimes, it is difficult to ascertain
how much the individual should be compensated—sometimes no amount of
money would really adequately compensate an individual. Thus, in many cases,
it is more efficient to rely on a system of ex ante regulations and inducements.
Thus, just as the assignment of rights can affect transactions costs (as our earlier
discussion emphasizes), so does the mode of enforcement.
We now turn to the broader issue of the assignment and definition of property
rights.
Slicing and dicing property rights
Property rights can be sliced and diced in different ways, and there may be
efficiency consequences (e.g., arising from coordination problems) in how prop-
erty rights are sliced and diced and how they are bundled. In many places, mineral
rights have been separated from land-use rights; use rights to land are separated
from rights to reassign those rights; air rights can be separated from land rights. In
real estate, there are often covenants and rights-of-way, which impose limitations
on the sale or use of the asset, and which give rights to others (such a right of
passage). Sometimes rights of passage are assigned to particular individuals (such
as those living in the neighboring house). Such rights might be transferable. But
sometimes such rights are extended to everyone within a wider class.
More broadly, an ownership right in a corporation or other property can entail
a right to an income and a control right, that is, a right to determine what can be
done with the asset, including rights concerning the transferring of rights. But
these two sets of rights are not always bundled together. There are, for instance,
nonvoting shares, which provide an entitlement to income, but no control rights.
But the rights of the voting shares are circumscribed: they may not take actions
which are considered “unfair” to minority shareholders or nonvoting shares. (In a
world with perfect contracting, the minority shareholders would know what
actions the majority would take before they bought the shares; restrictions
would be imposed to protect the interests of the minority. In reality, there are
no such protections; they would be impossible to write, and even more difficult
and costly to enforce.19) Again, there is no avoiding the necessity for policy choices
in the design of legal institutions for a market economy.
The meaning of control and ownership
With many different individuals having rights relating to a particular asset, the
question arises, who “owns” it? Language can often be misleading: It might be
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better simply to say that many different individuals have rights, and they, in some
sense, jointly own the asset. A well-specified ownership contract would say what
happens when there is a conflict, when two different individuals (“owners”) have
different views about what should be done. Often, though, contracts are ambigu-
ous (a point to which we will return later), and the courts are left to resolve such
conflicts on the basis of a set of principles and precedents. It should be clear that
the way the legal system resolves such conflicts has efficiency and distributive
consequences.
To avoid conflict, a particular party sometimes has “residual rights to control,”
i.e., rights not specified to others belonging to that party. The person with those
rights is sometimes described as the owner.20 Typically, he has the right to transfer
that right of control to others (the right to sell), but sometimes that right is
circumscribed (the owner of a cooperative apartment can only sell it to someone
who has been approved by the board of the cooperative). When he transfers his
rights, though, the rights of the others in the asset continue.21
The problem with the concept of “residual rights to control” is that it is actually
very difficult to specify completely what is meant by fully specified control rights
(and therefore, what is meant by fully specified property rights); governments, at
all levels, have some control rights in the sense they restrict the kinds of actions
that firms can undertake. In the case of “real assets,” there are a myriad of
constraints on the use of property, imposed by zoning laws, the Endangered
Species Act,22 etc. One can think of regulations more generally as constraints on
property rights: they restrict and limit what individuals or firms can do with the
assets that are under their control. Of course, every private contract imposes
constraints on what individuals and firms can do. When a bank extends a loan,
it can insist that a firm take certain action—the firm may have little choice but to
accept these demands, especially if it has debt obligations that could force it into
bankruptcy. (Advocates of unfettered markets often talk as if regulations are a
deprivation of property rights. But regulations—restrictions on how property can
be used—are better thought of as an essential part of the definition of the
specification of property rights. Criticism of regulation should not be that it has
deprived someone of a rightful property right, but rather that a particular restric-
tion interferes with desirable outcomes. In the case of appropriately designed
environmental regulations, it is clear that they lead to better outcomes.)
Ownership, as we have said, typically refers to the party that has residual
rights—given all of these other constraints, there may still be some scope of
choice, and the “owner” has the right to make a choice among this set. The
issue, of course, is often not what actions are “allowed,” but the consequences of
particular actions. There may be a law that prohibits polluting, but the firm can do
it anyway if it pays a fine. More generally, others affect the opportunity set of
firms, and thus affect what the firm chooses to do.
One aspect of “ownership” is the right to sell, but an individual’s willingness to
exercise that right is affected by the returns he gets from the sale. A capital gains
tax thus reduces an individual’s incentives to sell, though he retains the “right” to
do so. A 100 percent tax on the receipts from a sale would be almost the functional
equivalent of a prohibition on sale (not quite, because individuals might face
obligations from the ownership of an asset, and selling would free owners of those
obligations).
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By the same token, the legal/regulatory framework not only affects behaviors of
private parties, but also the behavior of government authorities. A law that requires
the government to compensate firms for “regulatory takings,” for the decrease in
the value of an asset as a result of a change in regulation, affects government’s
incentives for regulating. Those who advocate regulatory takings provisions do so
knowing that government is less likely to adopt environmental regulations if it has
budgetary consequences. Discussions of regulatory takings highlight the intertwin-
ing of property rights and incentives, and the complexity of control.
Corporate governance: shareholder capitalism
vs stakeholder capitalism
Neoliberal legal doctrines are often associated with a particular form of corporate
governance called shareholder capitalism. Corporations are told to maximize
shareholder value. That, it is argued, will lead to economic efficiency and societal
well-being. There are a large number of derivative propositions that follow. Rules
governing takeovers should be designed to ensure shareholder value.
The legal framework on corporate governance provides a case study for what is
wrong with the Chicago view. The belief that firms should maximize shareholder
value is a corollary of the simplistic competitive equilibrium model underpinning
their analysis. The logic is plain: in the simple neoclassical paradigm, workers and
the suppliers of other factors have a horizontal supply curve at the competitive
market price, so that the actions of the firm have no effect on them. The actions of
the firm only affect the residual returns. Thus, the controller of residual rights, in
exercising those rights, only affects his own well-being; and that is why allowing
him to do so naturally results in economic efficiency. Even within these narrow
confines, the result that shareholder capitalism leads to economic efficiency is not
in general true. It requires that there be a full set of risk markets (Arrow-Debreu
securities) extending for all dates into the future (Grossman and Stiglitz 1977).
Indeed, in general, different shareholders will not even agree on what the firm
should do to maximize their own interests (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980).
Indeed, the simple principle that firms should maximize shareholder value (a
seeming assignment of property rights to the firm’s shareholders) doesn’t fully
answer relevant legal questions: Whose judgment and in what time horizon?
Should management be allowed to decide what is in the long-run interests of
shareholders? Should the firm be put up for auction continuously, allowing
whoever bids the most to be the “owner”? What restrictions should be placed
on management, whose actions might adversely affect what bidders might be
willing to pay? Or should deference be given to management and its judgment of
what is in the long-term interests of shareholders? Economic theory again pro-
vides some (limited) guidance: only under very restrictive conditions will (unre-
stricted) takeover mechanisms be effective in ensuring efficiency, or even stock
market value maximization (Stiglitz 1972; Grossman and Hart 1980, 1981).
We have a whole set of laws affecting the behavior of management within
corporations. With imperfect information, restrictions on conflicts of interest may
lead to increased efficiency. To be sure, in some of these cases, contract terms
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(with penalties for breach) might do as well, but there are savings in transactions
costs23 in having standard contracts.24 Such laws would seem to benefit share-
holders and bondholders, at the expense of managers. More generally, different
rules for corporate governance can have markedly different effects on different
stakeholders. Germany’s model of stakeholder capitalism is, in many ways, as
effective America’s “shareholder capitalism,” but workers seem better protected.
There is less divisiveness.
We have argued that one cannot defend the “shareholder capitalism” model of
corporate governance on the basis of economic theory. But those who argue for
shareholder capitalism, as if it is the only natural form of capitalism, make another
mistake. They forget that the limited liability corporation (like intellectual prop-
erty, or property rights more generally) is a social construction with no inherent
rights. Governments, in creating these “artifices,” can impose any set of constraints
they wish. They can, for instance, impose constraints on the governance structure
of the corporations. Society grants limited liability, which means that, necessarily,
incentives are distorted (the corporations do not bear the full downside conse-
quences of their actions).
Especially in large corporations, control rights are ambiguous, but even if they
were well defined, “assigned” to shareholders, there is a problem: If shareholders
are dispersed, then the fact that good management of the company is a public
good (i.e., all shareholders benefit) means that each shareholder will underinvest
in monitoring. Effective control will reside elsewhere, in management and in
banks, whose interests may differ markedly from those of the shareholders and
workers. It is inevitable that governments will want to ensure that the decisions
taken by the firm advance the interests of stakeholders (and society more broadly),
and not just those who control the assets.25 This means that government will want
to impose constraints on corporations, on how they make decisions, including
how control of the assets is changed. That is why the issues discussed later in this
volume on corporate rights are so important.
We emphasized at the beginning of our discussion of property rights that
actions taken by any individual affect others. Corporations are large collectivities
of individuals, and not surprisingly, managerial decisions affect not just share-
holders, but a host of other “stakeholders”—bondholders, workers, suppliers,
customers, those in the communities in which it operates. That this is so can be
said to reflect a “market failure,” but it is worthwhile to ask more specifically why
this is the case. Part of the reason is that there is incomplete contracting and
incomplete insurance. A worker who goes to work for a firm does not know fully
the jobs that will be assigned to him, how difficult or unpleasant the tasks, the
hours that he might have to work. The firm might not know either (i.e., there may
or may not be asymmetries of information). There are contingencies that cannot
be perfectly anticipated. But different actions by the firm can affect the likelihood
of more or less pleasant contingencies occurring—and therefore affecting the
well-being of the worker. For example, the firm’s actions may increase the
likelihood that he will be redundant or the worker may have invested in (firm-
specific) human capital. But there is no insurance against the destruction of the
capital’s value should he be fired. Laws protecting worker rights often recognize
the importance of asymmetries in bargaining power that disadvantage workers.
A society in which firms are able, without restraint, to take advantage of that
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asymmetry may not only be inequitable, it may be less efficient. Bondholders are
aware that the firm may take actions that adversely affect their claims on the firm,
and that is why there are typically bond covenants. But it is well recognized that
these covenants only constrain a fraction of the possible actions that the firm
might undertake to adversely affect the value of bonds.
Actions of firms—including subsequent contracts with third parties—affect the
well-being of those who have previously signed (implicit or explicit) contracts.
Different governments take different positions on how these externalities might
best be dealt with, e.g., through a voice on the boards of directors, restrictions on
the kinds of contractual arrangements that can be undertaken, etc., with different
distributive consequences.
As an example, some governments require collective action clauses in bonds,
which allow a qualified majority (say 85 percent of bondholders) to restructure. It
is recognized that there may be circumstances in which renegotiation (a new
bond) is desirable, but that in such circumstances, a small minority can hold up
what might otherwise be a Pareto-superior renegotiation, demanding a ransom.
On the other hand, the ability of a (qualified) majority to restructure the debt
contract means that they can, in principle, redesign the contract in ways that work
markedly to the disadvantage of the minority, which may not be simply holding
up the majority, but may have legitimate differences in interests and perspectives.
Regrettably, it is difficult to write a simple legal framework that protects against
one abuse without opening up the window to another.
There is another set of “externalities” that may arise, which relate to signaling.
Bankruptcy provisions may be used to signal one’s likelihood of going bankrupt.
Firms that have a low probability of going bankrupt may signal that that is the
case by imposing heavy penalties on themselves should they go bankrupt. The
resulting signaling equilibrium is not Pareto-efficient. Signals are costly, and in
general, signaling equilibria are inefficient. Governments may enforce a better
equilibrium by eliminating the scope for signaling, e.g., by imposing a standardized
bankruptcy regime.26
Finally, it is impossible (and even if technically possible, prohibitively costly) for
contracts to anticipate every contingency. All contracts are incomplete, and there is
an important role for government to specify what happens in unanticipated
contingencies—a set of “defaults” that greatly simplify the writing of contracts.27
In addition to these externalities, there are a host of more widely discussed
macroeconomic externalities, where decisions by firms have social costs that they
do not appropriately take into account (just as firms do not appropriately take into
account environmental externalities). For instance, even without unemployment
insurance benefits, firms’ decisions concerning layoffs do not, in fact, lead to
Pareto efficiency.28 In unemployment systems that are not experience-rated, it is
obvious that when a firm lays off an individual, it imposes a social cost on others;
but the result holds even when unemployment insurance premiums are based on
experience. When a plant closes, workers lose not only their jobs, but, if the firm is
a large local employer, property values decrease. In making the decision to close
the plant, these externalities are seldom taken into account—and would be
disregarded by a profit-maximizing firm.29
Not only is it the case that managers in modern corporations often have
effective control, they have the incentives and ability to take actions that enhance
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their well-being at the expense of shareholders and the rest of society. (This is
sometimes called the agency problem, and can be viewed in part as an externality—
their actions have effects on other stakeholders, which they may not fully take into
account.)30 What has emerged in the United States is more akin to managerial
capitalism than “shareholder capitalism,” with wide latitude given to management,
which has resisted even shareholders having a say in pay. Courts have given
management wide deference in interpreting what is in the interests of shareholders.
It is clear that American-style managerial capitalism often does not serve share-
holders and bondholders well, let alone others in society. Rules and regulations limit
shareholders’ latitude in a variety of ways, e.g., voting, say in pay, poison pills,
golden parachutes, behavior of management, the extent of their control, and their
ability to exercise that control to advance their interests over those of shareholders
or other stakeholders. Such rules and regulations have both efficiency and distribu-
tive consequences.
Different countries have chosen markedly different systems of corporate gov-
ernance. In thinking about what system is right going forward, China should be
aware of the range of alternatives. Though the US system is often described as if it
were “shareholder” capitalism, it is in fact a system of managerial capitalism.
While the theoretical underpinnings for shareholder capitalism are weak, those
for managerial capitalism are even weaker. The system of corporate governance
that has evolved in the United States leaves much to be desired.
Security of property rights
We have emphasized that the very nature of what is meant by property—rights,
obligations, privileges, and constraints—is defined by the government. And just as
there cannot be fully specified contracts (defining what each party will do in every
contingency), property (with its rights, obligations, and constraints) cannot be
fully specified. New contingencies, not fully anticipated, will arise, and decisions
will have to be made about whether the rights, obligations, and constraints need to
be altered in response. It would be inefficient to bind totally the hand of govern-
ment, to say that it cannot change the rules of the game, the regulations that affect
what individuals can do. (Such a stance would also imply that governments could
not change taxes, since that affects the “rights” of what individuals can extract for
themselves from their assets.)
The world (and our knowledge of the world) changes. This will necessitate
changes in the rules and regulations that govern how resources can be used.31 It
would be wrong to freeze the rights and responsibilities at any moment of time.
“Excesses” of property rights (i.e. making it inordinately difficult to change the
rights, obligations, constraints, taxes, etc.) can adversely affect efficiency. Assigning
land rights to the commune in a way that could not be reversed would have
impaired the reforms that set off China’s march to a market economy. We want
to be able to impose new restrictions when circumstances or knowledge change.
On the other hand, if rights and responsibilities are always changing, then there
will be unnecessarily high levels of uncertainty about the value of any asset.
Investments will be impaired and people couldn’t reliably contract. It would
also be inefficient not to bind the hand of government to some extent. The
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question is where to draw the line—getting the balance right.32 There might be
several places to draw the line that might yield efficiency, but with different
winners and losers. Hence the extent to which the hand of government should
be bound is a question of policy.
Two examples illustrate. Before society was aware of the dangers of ground water
pollution, there was no need to impose restraints on the use of land as a toxic waste
dump. Once the danger becomes clear, it is imperative that constraints be imposed.
Earlier, we referred to the takings movement that has demanded that govern-
ment compensate property owners for changes in regulations. Adopting such an
approach would be a change in the property rights regime, for the owner of a
polluting factory would know that the cost of individuals suing him are such that
he could pollute with impunity. It would, in effect, be a transfer of wealth to the
owner from the rest of society. So too, the rules governing class action suits could
make it either easier (less expensive) or more difficult to sue. Thus, any change in
the legal framework has effects on the value of property rights. Government needs
to be aware of these effects, and it should be cautious in making such changes. But
when there are large enough changes in the world or in our knowledge of the
world, it would be wrong not to change.
Any government action or change in government action can affect property
values and rights, with complex distributive changes. We have noted that govern-
ments have a variety of ways (short of outright expropriation) of imposing
restrictions and taxes that, in a sense, deprive the “owner” of his property rights.
They decrease the (expected present discounted) value of the asset (to the owner).
There are always, of course, questions about the extent to which they are likely to
do so. If the increase in a tax or a new regulation was anticipated, then there will be
no change in market value; and indeed, failure to enact the tax or regulation as
anticipated would lead to an increase in market value. We have argued that no
government will (or should) fully circumscribe its ability to adopt legislation that
will allow it to respond to new information and changing circumstances. If a firm
has been polluting groundwater, poisoning others, in a way that was unnoticed
(and perhaps even not known), once it becomes known, it should be stopped—
and it is not obvious that it should be compensated for not poisoning others. The
building of a subway increases some property values and decreases others. We
typically neither compensate the losers nor appropriate but a fraction of the gains
of the winners. The passage of the Endangered Species Act (which restricts the use
of land when it adversely affects an endangered species) may have reduced the
value of some property. It may have increased the value of some neighboring
properties. But the next set of owners who buy the land knowing that the
legislation had been passed and assuming (along with the market) that it would
stay in place, would be affected in the opposite way if it were to be repealed. The
new owner would get a windfall gain, his neighbor (enjoying the preservation of
the land next door), a windfall loss.
Insecurity of property rights also arises from private actions. The value of a
house may be dependent on the view of the ocean or the peacefulness of the
neighborhood, but someone else can build and obstruct the view, or someone with
noisy children may move next door. In short, there is as much private interference
with property as there is public—all the other people’s rights and privileges that
may, or may not, be exercised.
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Property rights legislation must balance out the costs and benefits of any changes
(including the costs of not changing) and of the rules that govern how the changes
are made. In the United States, recent trends have emphasized paying more
attention to the costs (and possible resulting inequities) of changing regulations—
though we suspect that this is motivated little by an analysis of the economic costs;
legislation forcing those proposing new regulations to quantify the costs and
benefits is intended to make the process of adopting new regulations more difficult,
reducing the scope especially for environmental and safety regulations.
Legitimacy of property and security of property rights
There are many countries where questions have been raised about the legitimacy
of existing ownership claims. Some have advocated that such issues be put aside; it
is more important to have secure property rights. Hoff and Stiglitz (2004a, 2004b,
2007) have argued, however, that it is not possible for any society to provide such
security. So long as there is a widespread view in society that such rights were
obtained illegitimately, there will always be political pressures for property rights
reform. And no government can fully bind successors (though they can make it
more difficult or most costly for successor governments). One reason for having
“good” property rights laws (widely accepted as “legitimate,” and not the result
of special interests) accompanied by good judicial procedures (see below) is
that it enhances the chances that ownership claims will be viewed as legitimate
and that property rights will be viewed as more secure. The issue has played
out in many transition economies, which have faced difficulties in the initial
(re)assignment of property rights. Should they restore property as of 1944, 1945,
or 1946? Often, there were series of land redistributions; in each, land changed
hands. The date selected for restitution could have large effects on the well-being
of particular individuals. Russia is facing another problem: many of the assets
held by oligarchs were obtained via methods that were questionable at best.
Should one ignore how the property was acquired? In most societies, a person
who buys stolen property may still be forced to return it to the original owner.
There is a responsibility imposed on the buyer to ensure that the property
rights of the seller are “legitimate.” Much of the property of oligarchs can
be viewed as stolen from the state. But throughout the world, privatizations
were often conducted with a certain degree of “illegitimacy,” e.g., involving some
degree of corruption.
This raises another difficult issue: if we trace property throughout history, there
usually comes a point at which questions can be raised about legitimacy. Most of
the land in the US was taken from Native American tribes using a variety of
dubious methods. Advocates of “strong” property rights rarely reflect on the
legitimacy of their own claims.
China faces a similar problem; questions can be raised about the origins of the
wealth of many individuals. If their property rights are not secure, then they
will have an incentive to take their wealth out of the country as fast as possible
(a problem evident in Russia). If they are given full security, it would in effect be
sanctioning socially destructive behavior. China must resolve these issues as it
defines its property rights regime.
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Enhancing the security of property rights
Some “law and development” scholars have given primacy to assigning clear
property rights. Failure to develop is ascribed to a lack of property rights. Putting
aside the grandiosity of the claim—some countries have grown rapidly even with
seemingly imprecisely defined property rights—a formalization of rights, as part
of the process of providing more secure property rights, is an example of a change
to a legal system that can have profound distributive consequences. In the status
quo (before “precisely” defining property rights), there are certain outcomes to
economic interactions. They may not be perfectly predictable to every potential
participant in the market, but there are still patterns that can be ascertained. There
is, in effect, an existing set of “property rights,” which may not be easily under-
stood by everyone, but are understood by some. While there may be some
ambiguity about such property rights before they have been “assigned,” it is likely
that some ambiguity (as we have emphasized throughout this chapter) will remain
after. Indeed, formal rights are not clear to everyone either—they are clearer to
some market actors than to others; the clarity to foreigners may differ from that to
those for whom kinship and informal arrangements are well understood. It might
accordingly be better to say that formalizing rights reallocates transaction costs
(and, as always, such reallocations have distributive consequences).
Assigning property rights typically (or, I should say, inevitably) means a reassign-
ment. And this is also (especially) true in circumstances where property rights are ill
defined, so that it is hard to determine the effective recipient of the returns to the
assets or who has effective residual control. In other words, the “clear” assignment
of property rights is almost never just a conversion of de facto rights into de jure
rights. And a conversion from de facto to de jure is itself a reassignment, in that
there is a change in terms of how rights are known, remedies for violation, modes of
enforcement—the relationship of the “owner” to many people has changed, and
indeed, that is precisely the point of doing it. That is why property rights legislation
is often so contentious. If it were just a matter of clarifying existing rights, it would
presumably be a Pareto improvement, simply because it would lower transactions
costs. De Soto (2000) presumes that it is easy to figure out whom to title from
customary patterns. If it were so easy, then almost by definition, the property rights
question with which he is concerned would not have arisen.
Legal transplants
The property rights movement is an example of an attempt to transplant a legal
system that may work well in one context to another. “Legal transplanting”—
taking the legal frameworks developed for one country to another—often encoun-
ters problems. Another reason (besides those implicit in the previous paragraph)
is that there are typically a host of implied rules and understandings that govern
the interpretation of language and practice. Even if the formal language is
transplanted, the accompanying interpretations are not. What would the parties
to the contract reasonably have understood by the words of the contract? What is
meant by “due care”?
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FROM COASE TO DE SOTO AND BEYOND
The above analysis implies that the slogan that there should be well-defined
property rights is empty. It is impossible to have perfectly defined property
rights; there may be large costs associated with further refinements (removing
further ambiguities); it does not specify how rights (and obligations) might
change as circumstances and knowledge change; and saying that there should
be well-defined property does not say how questions about the relative strength
of various rights, duties, and privileges should be answered, e.g., when various
rights come into conflict. And how one answers these questions makes a
difference.
Those like de Soto (see, e.g., de Soto 2000), who seem to suggest that the
most important problem facing developing countries is the assignment of well-
defined property rights, fail to compare their reassignment to the preexisting,
often informal, social and institutional arrangements, and to assess the dis-
tributive consequences of the change. Moreover, they offer little guidance as to
how the various choices comprising a property regime ought to be made—
how strong or weak to make the various rights, duties, and privileges. Nor do
they tend to recognize the importance in mature property regimes of general
standards, such as “reasonable” or “fair use,” which often are understood by
reference to the informal arrangements and expectations of economic actors
themselves.
It is, accordingly, just wrong to think that simply assigning property rights will
solve complex social problems. The devil is in the details—how are they to be
assigned and enforced, which rights and obligations are to be included, what
excuses and limitations are to be recognized? How to redefine property rights
when circumstances (knowledge) change, as they inevitably do?
Property rights and credit markets
The one inefficiency that assigning land property rights is often said to solve is
credit market imperfections. Using land as collateral facilitates the development of
credit markets, and thus improves overall economic efficiency. But giving title to
land will not necessarily give rise to a land market, especially one of a thickness
that can support its use as collateral. Moreover, local courts may be loath to turn
over land to creditors in the event of a default. And there are other ways of
improving credit markets, e.g., through the revolving credit schemes used by
Grameen Bank and other microcredit institutions, as Chapter 4 points out—
schemes that, at least in some circumstances have performed far better than the
“property rights” approach. In addition, one can collateralize the produce of the
land, even if one can’t collateralize land itself. It may well be that preexisting social
arrangements offer alternative methods for collateralizing informally recognized
entitlements that are more effective than the formal system is likely to be.
Moreover, formal titling may well effect a redistribution of land, often within
the family (from wives to husbands)—in ways which may or may not enhance
efficiency.
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Imperfect property rights may suffice
Changing the relationship between farmers and their land played an important
role in China’s success. Moving to the household responsibility system did not
give farmers land “ownership.”33 More accurately, we should say that it gave them
some rights (that they did not have before), but it did not give them other rights
(e.g., the right to sell the land to others). It did give them the fruits of their labor,
and this had an enormous consequence for productivity. It achieved much of what
could have been achieved by full land titling. Individuals could not borrow, using
their land as collateral, to buy seeds and fertilizer. But this lacuna was at least
partially filled in by government and other arrangements, which ensured the
availability of high-quality seeds and some access to credit. Over the longer run,
full land titling might have resulted in many farmers borrowing beyond their
ability to repay, losing their land, creating a new class of landless workers—with
obvious implications for inequality, but also for efficiency (with an increase in
agency costs resulting from landlessness).34 In the medium term, there were some
efficiency issues: lack of security in land ownership may lead to underinvestment
in caring for the land. Inability to transfer land may mean that land is not
deployed in the best way. But as China’s development has progressed, one more
issue has arisen: who should reap the benefits of industrialization, with the
associated large increases in the value of land near cities? If it is given to the
farmer farming that land, it is simply a windfall capital gain, unrelated to his own
efforts. He benefits at the expense of others whose land was not so well situated. At
the same time, if his land is taken away without adequate compensation, that too
seems unfair. But then, what is adequate compensation? Enough to buy a similar
plot, of equal quality, elsewhere? But the farmer has ties to his community, and
there are high social costs of removing him. There are no easy answers to these
essentially distributive questions, though gradually societal consensus may
emerge. If the choice is between giving money to the poor farmer or to a corrupt
politician or a rich land developer, the farmer’s claims seem more justified. Today,
land titling is seen not just as a means of assuring efficient land usage, but also as a
form of protection for poor farmers, ensuring that they get a larger fraction of the
benefits that emerge from growth and urbanization.
Distributive consequences of property rights
assignments and alternative approaches
By the same token, assigning property rights to the lords in the seventeenth-century
enclosure movements may have been one way of avoiding the tragedy of the
commons, the problem of overgrazing. But most communities have found more
equitable ways of overcoming the tragedy of commons, e.g., by restricting the usage
of the commons, for instance by regulation. There were large distributive conse-
quences of the enclosure. It is a political and ethical judgment whether these large
distributive changes (typically adverse, from the perspective of equality) were
justified by the efficiency gains. (Economists may have simply played into the
hands of the powerful, giving them an excuse, a justification, for their land grab.)
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Many contend that something analogous is going on today, the enclosure of
common knowledge, its privatization through unbalanced intellectual property
regimes.35
Why less restrained property rights may lead to lower efficiency
The fallacious nature of the simplistic property rights school is deeper, because it
may not even result in enhanced efficiency.36 Consider the consequences of
allowing individuals to sell (without restriction) their land and to borrow against
the land. To answer this question, one can construct a dynamic model of land
ownership, which takes into account the various conditions under which indi-
viduals sell (or buy) land, e.g., illnesses of parents for which there is a medicine
that is available, but for which the public sector will not pay. There are large
societal costs of inequalities in land ownership—the agency costs associated
with a disparity between labor and land ownership. (There are other costs as
well—the landless face a much higher degree of insecurity.) Such a dynamic
model could describe the incidence of landlessness, the consequences of which
in turn may depend on the pace of job creation in the urban sector, and the levels
of education in the rural sector.
One could contrast the outcomes of this system of unrestricted property
rights with a system in which individuals are allowed to mortgage (a fraction)
of this year’s output, but not the land. There would be a short-run static ineffi-
ciency, arising from capital market imperfections (the extent of which might
depend on other attributes of the capital market), but this inefficiency might be
much less than the long-run inefficiency associated with the greater agency costs
arising from more extensive landlessness that would emerge in a system with
unfettered rights to sell. Long-run output in the system of unrestricted property
rights might be markedly lower than in the alternative system. While unfettered
rights to sell might lead to enhanced efficiency in a world without agency costs,
it may lead to reduced efficiency in a world with agency costs37 (Braverman-
Stiglitz 1989).
PROPERTY RIGHTS MORE BROADLY DEFINED
The role of legal frameworks in shaping rights and responsibilities—and
behavior—should now be clear. The discussion so far has focused on property
rights, broadly defined to include intellectual property rights and the “rights”
and obligations of other social constructs such as corporations. These broadly
defined property rights extend to contracts (what are enforceable contracts, the
rules for interpreting disputes when they arise, penalties that can be imposed
when contracts are abrogated) and bankruptcy laws (what happens when indi-
viduals or firms cannot meet the obligations that they have undertaken in a
credit contract).
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Labor rights
Modern economics emphasizes that the most important asset in modern societies
is not financial or physical capital, but human capital. Society puts all kinds of
restrictions on the use of human capital—e.g., on the set of admissible labor
contracts and how they can be enforced. Workers must receive a minimum wage
and they cannot sell themselves into bondage. Governments also enforce minimal
working conditions. In China, there is another important set of restrictions on the
mobility of labor, called the Hukou System, which is discussed in Chapter 15.
Individual decisions about where to live affect others, and so it is natural that
society might try to regulate those decisions.38 Moving into a crowded city with
well-paid jobs and public amenities benefits the individual, but may have adverse
effects on both the community from which he comes and the community to which
he goes. It may lead to excess population and fiscal burdens (to provide adequate
education, health, and transportation) in the latter and insufficient population (to
maintain essential serves and the tax base to support them) in the former. At the
same time, restrictions on labor mobility may create economic inefficiencies
narrowly defined, i.e., labor may not be used in a way that contributes optimally
to economic output, with labor productivity in a city being much higher than in
the rural area from which the migrant comes. Moreover, the system contributes to
inequality, with migrants who are essential for the country’s growth being treated
as second-class citizens, with their children not entitled to public education and
other public services,39 and with a risk of social problems arising out of the
peculiar structure to family life that often results when the family stays behind,
and the wage earners migrate temporarily. Reforming this system remains a
priority in China’s next stage of transition to a market economy.
By the same token, many laws and regulations arise to protect individuals
(especially as workers and consumers) against the abuse of market power or,
more generally, to enhance the efficiency of the market, when there is some other
form of market failure.
Social rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights brought to the fore the importance of
another set of economic rights, affecting access to certain goods, that follow simply
from the fact that an individual is amember of a particular community (a citizen of a
particular nation state). The constitutions and legal frameworks in different coun-
tries have elaborated, extended, and helped to define the scope of these rights. They
include rights pertaining to education, health, and minimum living standards for
bothworkers and retirees. As in other areas that have been discussed, the flip side of a
set of rights is a set of responsibilities. Resources do not come freely. A set of rights to
access certain goods is inextricably accompanied by obligations on others to pay for
those goods and perhaps by the recipients to fulfill certain conditions. The link
between these rights and conventional “property rights” is highlighted by discussions
about the provision of these goods as being part of a “social contract.” Some of the
key institutional aspects of these sets of rights are taken up in Chapters 13 and 14.
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We have emphasized that any assignment of rights has both efficiency and
distribution consequences. Neither can be ignored; neither has primacy over the
other. One key aspect of social rights is that such rights have important impacts on
different generations: guaranteeing higher incomes for the elderly imposes obli-
gations on those working, and may reduce resources available for the young. (See
in particular Chapter 13.) These issues become particularly important when age
structures change—as they are in China. The one-child policy combined with
advances in health extending longevity is quickly leading to an aging population.
China is the one country that appears to be growing old before it grows rich.
Environmental/natural resource regulation, while it affects the quality of life in
China today, also has important implications for intergenerational equity and
efficiency which we were unfortunately not able to pursue in this volume.
HAYEK AND THE “SECOND GENERATION”
CHICAGO SCHOOL
The neoliberal law and economics (Chicago) School focused on the design of
institutions to ensure economic efficiency. Nonmarket institutions were explained
in part as helping to ensure efficiency.40 There is another “conservative” tradition,
derived not so much from neoclassical economics, which focuses on equilibrium
models with antecedents in classical physics, as from Hayek, with antecedents in
evolutionary biology. The design of an economic system should facilitate growth
and change. It too focuses on “efficiency,” but often economic objectives are seen
as secondary to a broader objective of individual fulfillment, and this necessitates
individuals having “freedom” to pursue their own desires and ambitions.
In many ways, this approach is consistent with some of the perspectives in this
book. We have emphasized how institutional arrangements affect not just what
happens today but how society will evolve. We have argued that one needs to go
beyond a narrow emphasis on economic efficiency toward broader conceptions of
the nature of society and people and how individuals are shaped by social (insti-
tutional) arrangements.
There are several problems, however, with the Hayekian perspective. Focusing
on the narrower economic conception, there is, in fact, no theory that unfettered
markets will facilitate “efficient” evolution, whatever that might mean. While
evolutionary models have not been the object of the careful kind of scrutiny to
which the equilibrium models discussed in previous sections have been subjected,
it is already clear that many “market failures” are as relevant to evolutionary
behavior as they are to equilibrium behavior. A firm that has, for instance, high
long-run growth potential may be wiped out by a macroeconomic downturn; it
cannot borrow against its long-run profit potential to tide it over its current
difficulties. Firms that are weeded out in crises may be just as efficient as those
that survive; the main difference may be their choice of financial structures (debt-
equity ratios), which may have little to do with their real dynamic potential.41
There are at least two problems with the broader Hayekian perspective. First,
one individual’s freedom may impinge on the rights of others. One individual’s
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 25/10/2012, SPi
174 Law and Development Policies
Comp. by: PG2846 Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0001744174 Date:25/10/12 Time:17:16:34
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001744174.3D175
right to smoke may take away another individual’s right to not die from second-
hand pollution. Externalities constitute one of the main reasons for collective
action. A broad affirmation of “freedom” is far too vague to resolve questions
about whose ox must be gored as choices are made about the trade-offs inherent in
any legal regime.
There is another reason for collective action: through collective action, in many
cases, in principle, all individuals can be made better off, and in practice, most
might be made better off, e.g., through collective expenditures on public goods. To
be sure, forcing individuals to pay taxes may impinge on their “freedom,” but (if
they were being completely honest) they would agree that the benefits they receive
more than compensate.
There is a final problem, then, with the Hayekian perspective, perhaps the most
important. One individual’s “fulfillment” may come only at the expense of
constraints imposed on others, not just because of externalities, but because the
realization of an individual’s potential requires expenditures (on education, food,
health care) that the individual may not be able to afford himself. To finance these,
taxes must be imposed on others.
Political economy
The focus on change is picked up in another strand of (what I loosely call) theChicago
School. Political decisions are viewed as endogenous. Decisions today (about insti-
tutions, or about the distribution of income, or about policies) affect decisions in the
future. A decision today about the voting rule (whether a majority is required, or a
supermajority formaking a particular decision) affects the decisions thatwill bemade
in the future. Each decision has to be evaluated for its future consequences, and the
most important decisions are those that affect decision-making processes.
Recent discussions of transition from communism to the market have argued
that the assignment of control (property) rights, even before there is a clear rule of
law that specifies how those rights might be used or abused, will lead to the
adoption of a rule of law, with (more) clearly specified property rights. Hoff and
Stiglitz (2004a, 2004b, 2007) have argued, to the contrary, that the way control
rights were assigned (under shock therapy, rapid privatization) as well as specific
policies that were adopted (high interest rates, capital market liberalization)
undermined the demand for the rule of law and help explain why, in so many
of the former Soviet countries, a rule of law has not emerged.
Adaptive frameworks
The evolutionary approach rightly stresses change. Just as no contract can fully
anticipate every contingency that the parties to the contract may face, no law can
fully anticipate all the disputes that might arise. (If the law could anticipate all of
these contingencies, so presumably could the parties.42) These concerns are
especially important for China, which has an economy with distinctive character-
istics that is changing rapidly. It can learn from the problems facing other
economies, but inevitably some of the issues are sui generis.
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Problems arise when society and the economy change in ways that make the
legal (and other aspects of the institutional) infrastructure inappropriate and
unable to deal effectively with new situations. That is why one of the most
important features of a good legal framework is adaptability and flexibility, as
we noted earlier. At the same time, there is a cost: excessively frequent changes
give rise to legal uncertainty. And the frameworks that allow for flexibility often
have their own problems. Ordinary legislation requires broad consensus (in the
US, for instance, a minority can often effectively veto major pieces of legislation.)
Powers are delegated to regulatory bodies to enact regulations that respond to the
changing situations. But the regulatory bodies are often captured by special
interests, in particular those they are supposed to be regulating.
Some advocate self-regulation as a more flexible alternative. But it is hard for an
industry group to reflect adequately the interests of its customers or other parties
that might be injured by its actions.43 (The problems were brought to the fore by
the difficulties at the New York Stock Exchange and the attempts at bank self-
regulation, embodied in Basle II, which clearly failed so badly.)
There should be flexibility in the degree of flexibility and adaptability, accom-
panied by regular review processes that highlight problems in the institutional/
legal infrastructure, that allow some changes to the regulatory framework under
the aegis of a regulatory agency, but which submit more fundamental changes to
political processes.44
China, in its development strategy, based on the principle of “crossing the river
by feeling the stones,” has been sensitive to the necessity of this kind of pragma-
tism. But as China moves to the next stage of its transition, more formal insti-
tutional arrangements will have to be adopted to regulate its growing, and
growingly complex, economy. Such arrangements will inevitably circumscribe
some of the flexibility that might be achieved by more ad hoc approaches. The
institutional designers will, however, have to pay careful attention to preserving
adequate flexibility to the rapid changes going on, both inside China and in the
world around it.
DISTRIBUTIVE CONCERNS
The Chicago/neoliberal School emphasized the role of property rights and other
institutions in promoting efficiency. But institutions (and especially those relating
to legal structures) have often served another function: they have overtly distribu-
tive consequences.
There has long been an overtone of “social justice” by those outside of the
Chicago School, emphasizing the importance of the rule of law, which historically
circumscribed the ability of the King to act capriciously against the nobles. But
institutions and “the rule of law” have also been used to maintain existing
inequalities. We have already discussed how the seventeenth-century enclosure
movement was more about redistribution of wealth than an increase in efficiency:
there were alternative ways in which the tragedy of the commons could have been
avoided without the distributional consequences of the enclosure movement. The
current movement for the privatization of knowledge may have its roots more in
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a movement to increase incomes of certain corporations that are dependent on
intellectual property than in enhancing innovation. Privatizing knowledge may
actually retard innovation. (And if it were primarily concerned with incentives, it
would have provided more incentives for the preservation of biodiversity and
greater protection of traditional knowledge.) The rule of law was used to maintain
segregation and economic suppression in the American South. The rule of law
enabled banks to engage in predatory lending, and then to foreclose upon their
properties.
Whatever rules are adopted will have distributive consequences. If redistri-
bution were costless, this itself might not be of that much concern: the conse-
quences could always be undone by lump sum redistributions. But, as we have
seen, efficiency and equity concerns cannot be easily separated.45
Matters are worse: often the reason particular rules and regulations and insti-
tutions persist is that they have distributive effects that could not be achieved (or
achieved easily) in other ways. (This is related to the earlier point: there is always
an implicit set of property rights, including entitlements, and a change in the legal
framework accordingly inevitably has distributive consequences. One of the
problems with formalizing property rights that exist is that by making such rights
more transparent, they may make them political unacceptable.46 Alternatively, by
formalizing them, they make rights that should be unacceptable seem legitimate
and therefore protect and preserve them. In either case, formalization itself has
consequences.)
While property rights (and institutions, rules, and regulations more broadly) may
be used to protect existing inequalities, they can also be used to advance social
justice. One might argue that it might be more efficient to do this through lump sum
transfers, but such transfers are not feasible, and especially in developing countries,
there is a high opportunity cost to the funds. Social legislation may be a more
effective way of targeting. For instance, affirmative action programs circumscribe
what businesses can do; they may, as a result, be viewed as redistributing wealth
from businesses (and, since some of these costs are passed on to consumers, from
society more broadly) to the disadvantaged group. But the benefits that they bring
may be far greater than the value of the profits lost by firms or the slight increase in
prices consumers might have to pay.47, 48
Much social and economic legislation (restrictions on businesses employment
practices or anticompetitive practices) arises out of a belief that the unfettered
market may be, in some sense, “unfair.” Much of this is based on the premise that
the economy is not really fully competitive; there are many “bargaining” prob-
lems, and in the bargains, the poor and the less educated do poorly. There are
rents to be divided, and they get a disproportionately small share of these rents.
Rules and regulations can change the outcome, and while there may be some
efficiency costs, the redistributive benefits outweigh these efficiency costs.49
Similarly, if individuals are imperfectly informed, exploitive firms can engage in
predatory behavior (as America’s banks have done). Theorems about the efficiency
of competitive markets do not apply in such situations. Arguments that not
allowing firms to engage in such predations will interfere with the dynamism and
efficiency of the market economy are simply wrong. To the contrary, imposing such
restrictions might lead them to devote their create energy in ways that enhance
productivity or engage in other activities that might enhance societal well-being.
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In this view, then, how property rights are designed and assigned can make a
great deal of difference, and not just for the efficiency of the economy. Land
reform, redistributing land from large landlords to peasants, can increase
economic efficiency by reducing agency costs. Making it more difficult for
government to use its right of eminent domain to take land away from poor
peasants, to be used for development projects which may be of more benefit to
others, will ensure that they get a larger share of the rents associated with the
redeployment of land.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In recent decades, there has been important scholarly progress on the relationship
among law, economics, and development. Coase played an important role in
helping us think about the consequences of alternative assignments of property
rights. Unfortunately, the neoliberal legal tradition, especially simplifications that
have gained currency in some traditions within economics, neither reflects an
understanding of the limitations of markets, the importance of equity, and the
constraints and costs of redistributions, nor the conceptual complexities associ-
ated with property and property rights.
In the beginning of China’s move to a market economy, there was a discussion
of the central ingredients required to make a market economy work. Obviously,
many ingredients contribute to success. At a conference in Wingspread, Wiscon-
sin, with a delegation from China’s Academy of Social Sciences, there was
extensive discussion of the relative role of property rights and competition. Ken
Arrow and I urged that the focus be on competition.50 Russia and many other
Eastern European countries chose to emphasize property rights, with little atten-
tion to broader legal structures, including corporate governance; some Western
advisers supported this strategy, arguing that good legal structures would follow
naturally. They didn’t, and inappropriately designed property rights provided
flawed incentives, leading to asset stripping, impeding development. The con-
trasting performance of China and Russia is, in large measure, a result of these
fundamental choices made early on in the process of transition (see Stiglitz 2000b,
2001b; Hoff and Stiglitz 2004b).
While this chapter—and much of this part of the book, focuses on property
rights, it is important to keep this issue in perspective. This chapter has empha-
sized that not only did the neoliberal law and development literature overly
simplify what was entailed when they instructed countries to provide and enforce
clear property rights, but they almost surely overemphasized their importance and
underemphasized other institutional reforms necessary to create a successful
economy.
This chapter echoes several themes that are raised throughout the book. There
is no single “best” legal system; law is not just about enhancing efficiency, it is also
about promoting other societal values such as social justice; different legal
systems, like different assignments of property rights, have different distributive
consequences, and reflect the norms of society. But they also affect how society
evolves. Changes in the legal system, even attempts to formalize property rights,
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have distributive consequences. Countries have choices—there is not a single Pareto-
dominant approach—and those choices do make a difference, both today and in the
future.
These are important lessons for China to take on board as it develops the legal
frameworks “with Chinese characteristics” that will enable it to continue its
transition to a market economy with Chinese characteristics.
NOTES
1. I am indebted to David Kennedy for his insightful comments on law and economics, and
to Mo Ji for her insights on the application of these ideas to China. Earlier versions of
this chapter were presented to various meetings of the IPD China Task Force, with the
financial support of the Brooks World Poverty Center and Columbia’s Committee for
Global Thought. I am indebted to the participants in those task forces for helpful
comments.
2. As we noted in the introductory chapter, we use the term “neoliberal” orthodoxy and the
“Chicago School” interchangeably, as a simplification to describe a complex set of ideas
within which there are many variants. We should emphasize that there are many
economists and legal scholars at Chicago who do not subscribe to what has come to
be called the Chicago School. While the distinctions among the adherents of neoliberal
doctrines are important, in practice, the distinctions are typically glided over. In its
heyday, these ideas were extraordinarily influential in shaping development policy,
especially the set of policies that were pushed by the World Bank and the IMF in the
’80s and early ’90s (Stiglitz 2002a). Interestingly, John Williamson, who best articulated
the resulting “Washington Consensus” was himself skeptical of unfettered markets, in
particular of unbridled short-term capital flows. See Williamson (1990, 2008), Serra and
Stiglitz (2008), and Stiglitz (2008a).
3. A result that was “conjectured” by Adam Smith, in his famous “invisible hand theorem,”
that the pursuit of self-interest led, as if by an invisible hand, to the efficiency of the
market (Smith 1776). Smith himself was more aware of the limitations of this conjecture
than his latter-day followers (see, e.g., Rothschild 2001; Kennedy 2009; Phillipson 2010).
It was to take 175 years before Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959) ascertained
the limited conditions under which Smith’s conjecture was correct. The conditions in
which markets did not lead to efficient outcomes were referred to as “market failures”
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980).
4. Moreover, in the presence of wealth effects, there are real consequences of these
distributional differences: the equilibrium that emerges may be markedly different
under alternative assignments of property rights. Still, different assignments can gener-
ate efficient outcomes. Coase himself was not so naïve as to think that transaction costs
could be ignored, recognizing that they are ubiquitous. Law and economics scholars
have been obsessed with transaction costs, from the first interpretations of Coase by
Calebresi through to today’s leading figures; see Calebresi and Melamen (1972). For a
brief summary and bibliography of the American law and economics literature, see
Kennedy and Fisher (2006: 403–13).
5. One of the reasons that little attention was paid to distribution was that it was typically
assumed in simplistic Chicago-style models that redistributions were costless. Hence,
all that was required was to ensure efficiency. But redistributions are often very costly,
and indeed, often don’t occur. The rules of the game thus determine the well-being of
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different members of society. See Coase (1960), Stiglitz (1994), and the references
cited there.
6. The US Supreme Court decision (Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 1993) limiting the scope of claims on anticompetitive predatory
behavior is illustrative of the influence of the Chicago School in this area.
7. Sometimes advocates of the Chicago School economics argue (simply as a matter of
assertion) that these imperfections and their consequences are quantitatively insignifi-
cant. One of the main results of the modern theory of the economics of information is
to show, however, that even a little bit of information imperfection can have a very
large effect and change the qualitative properties of the economy. See Stiglitz (2002b).
Chicago School economists also often argue that even if markets “fail,” governments
often fail too. But such failures are not inevitable—in all the most successful economies
government played an important role—and the objective of this chapter (and other
chapters in this book) is to enhance understanding of what kinds of government
interventions and actions are most likely to work.
8. Some go so far as to point out the inefficiencies that result from restricting bonded
labor, with an overtone that perhaps even these restrictions should be eliminated.
9. In Chicago School economics, the owner of IPR could act as a perfectly discriminating
monopolist, and there would be no inefficiency. But an individual would not have the
information required to act as a perfectly discriminating monopolist, and the resulting
distortions can be considerable (see, e.g., Stiglitz 1977 for the inefficiencies arising from
monopolies with imperfect information, and Stiglitz 2006 and Henry and Stiglitz 2010,
as well as the chapters below, for a discussion of the distortions arising from the IPR
system).
10. As we noted earlier, if farmers tend their own land, there is no problem of incentivizing
them; but if farmers have no land, then common forms of tenancy lead to large
inefficiencies. Sharecropping—in which farmers give the landlord 50 percent (or
more) of their produce, attenuates incentives. One of the implications of the Green-
wald-Stiglitz (1986) analysis is that market equilibrium in such situations is almost
never Pareto-efficient.
11. In the standard sense of Paretian efficiency.
12. Partially because governments do not have the information required to engage in lump
sum redistributions (see Stiglitz 1994).
13. There is a further problem of attribution, which has become particularly relevant in the
debate over global warming: should the producer or the consumer of the good be
charged for the cost of the greenhouse gases emitted? In perfectly competitive markets,
it would make no difference. But markets are typically not perfectly competitive, so
how such questions are answered has real consequences; see Stiglitz (forthcoming).
14. All property rights are, we have argued, social constructions; the definitions of rights,
obligations, and constraints associated with real property have evolved over centuries
and therefore are more likely to be taken for granted.
15. We elaborate on these points at greater length in the discussion below on “control.”
16. The logic is that since only a fraction of those who commit the wrong are caught and
convicted, optimal deterrence requires that the penalty when they are caught be a
multiple of the costs imposed in that particular instance; see Becker (1968). There is
good reason for using private enforcement: political influence may impede public
enforcement. Such concerns were particularly important in the context of antitrust
laws, where large monopolies had the resources to try to induce government not to take
actions against them.
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17. This discussion also helps explain why, ordinarily, there should be no compensation for
regulatory takings. If the regulation is directed at limiting a negative externality, the
effect on the value of the property will be limited, so long as the individual had
previously faced liability for these negative externalities.
18. If it is assumed that the government can’t assess the risks and costs of injury-inducing
consequences of certain individual behavior, or at least assess it better than private
participants, then making them pay the costs of the injury ex post will more likely lead
to “correct” decisions, than would be the case if the government imposed a tax.
19. They would have to anticipate every conceivable situation that might arise. It is obvious
that this is impossible—how could one have written a contract contingent on an
explosion at a neighboring nuclear power plant, before the concept of nuclear energy
had even been conceived? There are always ambiguities in language. Even when
contracts are tightly written, there are questions about whether a particular circum-
stance falls within the ambit of a particular provision. Background law specifies what
happens when a contingency not explicitly written into the contract occurs.
20. There has been extensive discussion in the US of the consequences of the separation of
ownership and control in corporations (Berle andMeans 1932). In that context, control
is exercised by management (not be shareholders)—even though formally manage-
ment is not the owner. Though in principle, shareholders have the “right” to choose a
new management, there are significant impediments to their doing so. See, e.g. Stiglitz
(1982b, 1985a). See the discussion in the next section.
21. Though some rights may be contingent on ownership, i.e., when the “owner” sells,
other rights terminate.
22. A US law that ensures that the owner of property (such as a forest) does nothing that
adversely affects an endangered species.
23. Not only savings in writing contracts, but in interpreting them. Again, standard
contractual forms could arise naturally. But difficulties arise with interpreting the
(inevitably) incomplete contracts.
24. Additional problems may arise from signaling inefficiencies.
25. There is a large literature on how corporations can try to align the interests of managers
with shareholders, e.g., with stock options. But there is overwhelming evidence that
these attempts have failed, and that indeed, stock options have provided incentives for
managers to distort the information that they provide to the market and have encour-
aged excessive risk-taking and short-sighted behavior, with consequences that are
adverse to the interests of shareholders, bondholders, and other stakeholders. For a
discussion of such behavior in the context of the most recent crises and financial
scandals in the US, see Stiglitz (2003, 2010). The problems are inherent, arise out of the
inevitable information asymmetries and the public-good problem of “good manage-
ment”; the separation of ownership and de facto control has long been a source of
concern about economists and lawyers, but this concern has often been given short
shrift in the Chicago view (see Stiglitz 1985a; Berle and Means 1932).
26. In technical terms, this is referred to as imposing a pooling equilibrium. A competitive
market equilibrium cannot be characterized by pooling (one of the central results of
Rothschild-Stiglitz 1976). The inefficiencies in contractual equilibria are, however, not
limited to problems of signaling. In moral hazard models, contracts by one party affect
reservation levels and behavior within other contracts. See, e.g., Rey and Stiglitz (1993)
and Arnott and Stiglitz (1985).
27. Asymmetric information can also explain why the economy may get stuck at an
inefficient contractual equilibrium. See Stiglitz (1992a).
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28. This is seen most obviously in efficiency wage models, where wages affect productivity
either because of effects on incentives, selection, morale, or labor turnover. For instance,
in the Shapiro-Stiglitz “shirking” model, firms must pay a high enough wage to induce
individuals not to shirk. The requisite wage depends on the unemployment rate and the
length of time that individuals remain in the unemployment pool. Firms that have a
policy of letting go of labor more easily lead to higher labor turnover, and, at any
unemployment rate, a shorter duration in the unemployment pool. This means that
the equilibriumwage and unemployment rate will be higher. More generally, it is optimal
to throw “sand in the wheels”: some friction, e.g., associated with mandatory severance
pay. See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984); Arnott and Stiglitz (1985); Rey and Stiglitz (1993);
Stiglitz, (1974a, 1982a, 1992b).
29. In the absence of insider trading rules, it might even profit from the foreknowledge of
the plant closing. This is another example of how the legal framework helps shape
incentives and behavior.
30. There is a huge literature on agency issues, which can be viewed as the central issue in
incentives. See, e.g., Stiglitz (1974b) or Ross (1973).
31. Fifty years ago, we did not know of the risks of global warming or of the dangers of
certain toxic wastes.
32. The choice is parallel to that which we discuss at greater length below concerning
broader rules of the game. Good systems need clear rules. But when the world changes,
the rules have to change. Putting too many of the rules in a hard-to-change constitution
leads to societal rigidities, impeding adaptability to changing circumstances—some-
thing Europe is learning at great cost.
33. The word “ownership” is in quotes to remind the reader that property rights always are a
bundle of rights and responsibilities, and that such bundles can take a variety of forms.
34. See Braverman and Stiglitz (1989).
35. Boyle (2003).
36. As Chapter 8 points out, “strengthened” intellectual property rights introduce static
inefficiencies, and if the system of IPR is not well designed, may not lead to offsetting
dynamic benefits.
37. More generally, an implication of the Greenwald–Stiglitz (1986) theorem is that
privately profitable contracts may not be socially efficient. The set of contractual
arrangements that evolved in the US involving first and second mortgages, “serviced”
by service providers without due attention to conflicts of interest and the potential need
for renegotiation has resulted in large inefficiencies, including large transactions costs.
38. Note that the United States does similar things with different mechanisms—a combin-
ation of zoning (of “nonresidential” land, of minimum acreage for housing or single-
unit housing, which affects housing costs), vagrancy laws, location and arrangement of
transport networks, etc., affects where individuals live. So too do patterns of expend-
itures on local publicly provided goods, such as education. Still, there is a difference
between these indirect control mechanisms and more direct control mechanisms,
though the direct control mechanisms work mostly indirectly, through the rights of
access to local public services.
39. Such discrimination of immigrants is common; what is perhaps unusual about China is
that these are domestic migrant workers, rather than foreign.
40. They were mainly based on assertions, not deep economic analysis. Indeed, nonmarket
institutions that might arise in response to a market failure (e.g., imperfect insurance
arising out of imperfect information) may actually decrease efficiency—making everyone
in society worse off; see Arnott and Stiglitz 1991). For more general discussion of these
issues and references, see Stiglitz (2000a, 2001a).
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41. Indeed, the evidence in the case of the Korean crisis of 1997–8 is consistent with this
perspective. For broader discussions of the inefficiency of evolutionary processes, see
Stiglitz (1975, 1994).
42. The issue is more complex than this sentence suggests. It is not just a matter of
anticipating different contingencies. There are large transaction costs associated with
resolving what should be done in each contingency. It makes little sense to bargain
about what to do in contingencies that are unlikely to occur. Moreover, between now
and the time that the particular contingency could occur, other information/events
may occur that may alter the set of efficient actions in that contingency, or affect the
bargaining position. If each individual believes that the intervening events will redound
to their favor, it may be easier to reach compromise by postponing the specification of
the action to be taken in that contingency. Legal frameworks may specify the permis-
sible degree of ambiguity for the contract to be valid. And again, the legal framework
can have distributive, as well as efficiency, consequences. One party may take advan-
tage of another knowing that ex post, the other party will be in a weaker bargaining
position, and that the individual does not know that now.
43. Equally, since corporations are represented by their management, it is hard for self-
regulation to protect an industry against actions by management that might be adverse
to the interests of shareholders and bondholders—which was evident in the 2008 crisis
in the US.
44. To put it in another way: we can think of two stages in the analysis, a specification of
how the consequences of risk are borne among the parties and a specification of how
the allocation of the consequences is borne can be changed. There are distributional
consequences to each specification. The latter inevitably entails not just private parties,
but public actors.
45. Moreover, inequities of wealth created by an unbalanced legal system can be self-
perpetuating: wealth influences political processes to ensure that redistributions do not
occur and to push for legal reforms that perpetuate and enhance inequities.
46. This also helps explain why it is often difficult to make seeming Pareto improvements,
e.g., converting distortionary agriculture subsidies into a lump sum annual equivalent.
Because governments cannot make binding commitments, farmers would not believe
that those payments would continue, once their magnitudes become clear—it would
almost surely be unacceptable for a rich corporation to receive millions for doing
nothing, though it is acceptable for the same corporation to receive similar amounts for
producing corn. But there is in fact a double commitment problem: even if the farmers
were to agree to take a lump sum payment up front in return for the elimination of
their subsidies, it may be difficult to enforce. After they receive the up-front payment,
they may once again lobby for subsidies.
47. To return to the “transactions cost” perspective, the costs associated with achieving
these distributive outcomes from this implicit legal assignment of rights may be
markedly lower than achieving similar outcomes in other ways.
48. There are even some instances in which such legislation can move an economy from
one equilibrium to a Pareto-superior equilibrium. There can exist multiple equilibria,
some entailing discrimination, others without discrimination.
49. This is especially the case since the original equilibrium was not itself efficient, because
of market failures (e.g., the presence of imperfections of competition).
50. My paper (1980) is available in Chinese as part of Selected Works on Economics by
Joseph E. Stiglitz.
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